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THE PUBLIC LIBRARY AS A PUBLIC FORUM: THE
(DE)EVOLUTION OF A LEGAL DOCTRINE
John N. Gathegi1
When dealing with First Amendment free speech issues in the context of public
libraries, courts have merely cited the supposition that constitutional public forum
analysis leads to the conclusion that the public library is a limited public forum
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. By focusing narrowly on the issue
of whether Internet access in libraries constitutes a public forum, and determining
that it does not, the U.S. Supreme Court not only misses an opportunity to refine
the concept of the public forum in modern-day terms but also somehow implies
that public library activities are different from other speech activities and are subject
to the managerial authority of the government. This article makes the argument
that a redefinition of the public forum doctrine would bring under its ambit the
public library, to join the “traditional” public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and
parks—a departure from the current designation of the public library as a limited
public forum. This article also examines the extent to which the Internet represents
an expansion of the forum, whether public or limited. The argument is structured
within the framework of the decision in the case of United States v. American Library
Association.
I. Introduction
In its 2003 decision in United States v. American Library Association, the U.S.
Supreme Court squandered an opportunity to define analytically what kind
1. Associate professor, School of Information Studies, Florida State University, 238 Louis
Shores Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2100. Telephone 850-644-8104; Fax 850-644-6253;
E-mail jgathegi@lis.fsu.edu.
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2 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY
of forum a public library is [1].2 When dealing with First Amendment free
speech issues in the context of public libraries, courts have merely cited
the supposition that constitutional public forum analysis leads to the con-
clusion that, for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, the public
library is a limited public forum.3 By focusing narrowly on the issue of
whether Internet access in libraries constitutes a public forum, and deter-
mining that it does not, the Court not only misses an opportunity to refine
the concept of the public forum in modern-day terms but also somehow
implies that public library activities are different from other speech activ-
ities and are subject to the managerial authority of the government.4
This article rejects the conclusionary views of the courts of the status of
the public library as a limited forum, arguing instead that a redefinition
of the public forum doctrine would bring under its ambit the public library
to join the “traditional” public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks.5
This article further subscribes to the view that a traditional forum analysis
is inappropriate and stultifying and that a compatibility test, while not by
itself optimal, yields the more plausible analytical results.
Why, one might ask, does it matter what type of forum a public library
is characterized as? A partial answer, as we shall see below, emerges from
the fact that such a characterization determines the different levels for
review of regulations that constrain speech.6 In a public forum, regulation
of speech is examined under strict scrutiny, while regulation of speech in
government property that is not a traditional public forum is examined
2. United States v. American Library Association was a case reviewing the constitutionality of the
Childrens’ Internet Protection Act (CIPA) on a facial validity challenge. Most of the legal
and nonlegal commentary on this case has focused on the vagueness and overbreadth
arguments made in the lower court, while ignoring two major important points: the Court’s
focus on whether or not access to the Internet opened up a public forum and whether
or not a spending clause analysis applies to this forum.
3. See, e.g., [2–4]. Both Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown and Mainstream
Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Library carefully examined the forum nature of the public
library and, using the Court’s classic forum analysis, came to the conclusion that the public
library is a limited public forum. It is this classical analysis that this article challenges.
4. While there are differences in the meanings of the Internet and the World Wide Web
(the Web), I shall, in this article, use the two terms interchangeably.
5. Public forums may be favorably compared to the “public spheres” of deliberation that
Jurgen Habermas described as emerging in the eighteenth century, though the latter were
developed by the bourgeoisie. While I believe an examination of the concept of “public
spheres” would uncover unmistakable alignment to the concept of public forums, that
examination is outside the scope of the present discussion and will have to be carried out
separately in another work [5].
6. “Consideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a reg-
ulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the
characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.” See [6, p. 732].
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PUBLIC LIBRARY AS A PUBLIC FORUM 3
only for reasonableness [6]. I shall discuss below the significance of the
different levels of review.
The rest of this article is structured in five major parts. In Sections II
and III, I review public forum doctrine by discussing the two major con-
stitutionally recognized fora: the traditional public forums and the des-
ignated or limited public forums.7 I ignore nonpublic forums because they
are generally outside of forum analysis, unless they have been opened up
to some sort of expressive activity. In Section IV, I examine the public
library in the context of public forum doctrine, specifically discussing the
question of what type of a forum it is. I do this by reviewing forum analysis
as applied to public libraries by the courts and by demonstrating that this
analysis has been flawed, or needs modification. Section V critically ex-
amines the status quo of the public library in the context of constitutional
forum analysis after United States v. American Library Association. I offer my
conclusions in Section VI, arguing that the public library should assume
its seat in the quintessential traditional public forums, if we must use that
analysis, or that, alternatively, we should redefine what a public forum is
and ensure that the public library fit in that definition.
II. Traditional Public Forums
Traditional public forum doctrine recognizes places like streets, parks, and
sidewalks as comprising quintessential public forums. Curiously, despite its
anchor in government property, this doctrine was born out of private
property ownership, typified by the Court’s firmness on “the right of
owners of private property to prevent others from using their property
for speech purposes” because it “would be an unwarranted infringement
of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights” [7].
But if state property is also public property, how can we use private
property notions to define public forums? The 1897 case of Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. Davis [8] attempted to solve the public forum problem
by appealing to common law private property concepts. In a state supreme
court ruling by Justice Holmes, later confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court
(under Chief Justice White), the fact that the legislature had the power
to end the right of the public to enter a public space meant that it could
also limit the public use to certain purposes. Later U.S. Supreme Court
First Amendment doctrine refined this approach severely. In 1939, Justice
7. Occasionally, the courts will use the word “fora” as the plural of “forum.” However, the
typical usage is “forums,” which I will henceforth follow.
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Roberts, implicitly accepting the Holmes-White approach, appeared to cre-
ate “a kind of First-Amendment easement” [9, p. 13]. Those public places
that had been traditionally used for free speech purposes could continue
to be so used, but the state was free to regulate other property that had
not been traditionally so used.
Thus, the Court’s public forum analysis has its origins in Justice Robert’s
dictum in Hague v. CIO :
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of
a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of
views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. [10, pp. 515–16]
In the same year (1939), in Schneider v. State [11], the Court held that a
city’s interest in maintaining “the streets clean and of good appearance” was
“insufficient” to defend a city ordinance that prohibited leaflet distribution
on public property. Jamison v. Texas [12] followed suit by invalidating another
city ordinance that prohibited leaflet dissemination. This view of the street
as a public forum was reinforced in United States v. Grace [13], in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute that prohibited the display of
“any flag, banner, or device designed to bring into public notice any party,
organization or movement” on sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court.
The Court recognized public sidewalks to be a public forum where restriction
of public expression could only be limited by content-neutral, reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations. In this particular case, the Court held
that the restrictions were not reasonable, as a total ban of the expressive
activities was not necessary to “maintain proper order and decorum” near
the Supreme Court. Following Justice Robert’s dictum, the Grace Court re-
affirmed that streets, sidewalks, parks, and such “public places” historically
associated with the free exercise of expressive activities “are considered,
without more, to be ‘public forums’” [13, p. 177].
However, the Court in Grayned v. Rockford [14] upheld the conviction of
a demonstrator involved in a march protesting a public high school’s racial
policies that was held on a public sidewalk near the school. Here, the Court
elucidated that, even though the public sidewalk from the high school
could not be declared off limits to expressive activity, such activity may be
prohibited if it materially disrupts class work or invades the rights of others.
The crucial question, the Court said, “is whether the manner of expression
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is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time” [14, p. 116].
Thus, following this logic, the Court in Boos v. Barry [15] was able to
uphold a District of Columbia code that made it illegal to disobey a police
order to disperse from an assembly of people within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy when the embassy’s security or peace was reasonably believed to
be under threat. Similarly, the Court in Frisby v. Shultz [16] let stand a town
ordinance that prohibited residential picketing that focuses on a particular
residence—in this case, the residence of a doctor who performed abor-
tions. The Court felt the ordinance was constitutional because it was nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left the door
open for other alternative channels of communication. The Court, as in
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, appeared here to pay homage to the sanctity
of a man’s home and to balance residential privacy against the elevated
status of the street as a public forum.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence [17], the Court upheld a
National Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping overnight in tent
cities it had allowed to be erected in a park for the purposes of demon-
strating the plight of the homeless. Here, even though the park was con-
sidered a public forum, and the tent cities symbolic speech, the Court
found the no overnight sleeping regulation was a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction to limit the “size and duration” of similar dem-
onstrations. Similarly, a New York City regulation mandating the use of
city-provided technicians and sound systems for concerts in Central Park
was found to be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, because
the restrictions were “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they [were] narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest” in protecting the city’s citizens from unwelcome
noise, despite the fact that the regulations were not the least intrusive
means of doing so, and because they “[left] open ample channels for
communication of the information” [18, p. 802].
In 1966, when affirming the conviction on trespass charges of some
Florida A & M students who had gone to a jailhouse entrance to protest
the arrest of their schoolmates who had been engaged in a civil rights
demonstration that tried to integrate public theaters, the Court, again
invoking notions of private property ownership, stated that “the State, no
less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated” [19].
Thus, it appears that there are sidewalks, and then there are sidewalks—
that is, not all sidewalks open to the public are public forums. In United
States v. Kokinda [6], the Court distinguished between a postal sidewalk
and a regular sidewalk. The former “was constructed solely to provide for
the passage of individuals engaged in postal business” and does not “have
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the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive ac-
tivity” [19, p. 727].
Here then, we start to see the beginnings of a concern with the function
of the property, when the property involved is not a traditional public forum
or has some other specialized function. An opportunity to extend the inquiry
arose in a most unlikely place: airport terminals. The question of whether
airport terminals are public forums had dogged the courts for a while, with
splits among the circuit courts, the majority holding the view that the public
spaces in airports are public forums.8 International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Lee [25] provided an opportunity to resolve the question.
The case is remarkable, not for its clarity in resolving the issue but in
its analysis of the various categories of forums. The Krishna Court deter-
mined that an airport terminal is not a public forum for First Amendment
purposes, and, thus, a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a reasonableness
standard [25]. But in a companion decision regarding the constitutionality
of banning distribution of literature in airport terminals, such a ban on
leafleting, as opposed to soliciting, was held invalid [26].
The Krishna Court, in terms reminiscent of Robert Post’s theory of man-
agerial authority (discussed below), distinguished the regulation of speech
where the government is acting as a manager from similar regulation where
it is acting as a governor. Rules regulating speech are different in mana-
gerial authority than in governance. As in Kokinda, “where the government
is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations rather than acting
as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be
subjected to heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be
subject” [25, pp. 2705–6]. Thus, we see the Krishna Court’s criteria for
identifying a public forum: (1) tradition and (2) purpose [25, p. 2704].
The Krishna Court, drawing from Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association [27], also delineated three categories of public prop-
erty and their correspondent degree of “public fora,” what it called a
“forum-based” approach.
In this section, I have discussed the first kind of forum: the public forum.
Below, I shall examine the other forum categories that do not fall under
this rubric. To recapitulate, content-based speech regulations in a public
forum are proscribed. To survive strict scrutiny, such regulations must serve
a compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. Reasonable, content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions are,
however, permitted [28].
8. See, e.g., [20–24].
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III. Designated Public Forums (and Limited Public Forums)
The designated forum is hewn out of the government property that is not
a traditional public forum but in which expressive activity is nevertheless
allowed. This property generally does not satisfy public forum criteria, but
the government reserves power to dedicate the property for all or limited
speech. The government does this “by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for discourse” [25, p. 2706]. Here, unlike in the protected
public forum above, the government often restricts speech to retain the
designated property’s purpose. Also, the government may choose to elim-
inate the speech-dedication designation of such property [26, pp. 2718–19]
because, according to Greer, “the government does not create a public
forum by inaction. Nor is a public forum created ‘whenever members of
the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the
Government’” [29]. However, once created, designated public forums af-
ford the same level of protection from regulation of speech as the public
forums do. As in the public forums, valid time, place, and manner regu-
lations are allowed. To be valid, however, the regulations must (1) be
content neutral, (2) be designed to serve significant government interests,
including public health and safety, and (3) leave ample alternative channels
for expressive activity.
Whether a forum is viewed as a designated or limited public forum is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Both Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun,
for example, looked at (1) whether or not the government intended to
designate a facility as a public forum, (2) the extent of the use the gov-
ernment has allowed in the facility, and (3) whether the nature of the
forum is compatible with expressive activity.
Because nonpublic forums are not the focus of this article, I shall make
only a fleeting reference to them. As I have discussed above, government
regulations that constrain speech, both in a traditional or a designated
public forum, will be examined under strict scrutiny. Such restrictions in
nonpublic forums, however, will only be reviewed for reasonableness [6].
For nonpublic forums, the reasonableness requirement is easily sur-
mountable: a restricting regulation need not be the most reasonable or
the only reasonable limitation; it need only be reasonable [6, p. 3124; 30,
p. 808]. Reasonableness will “be assessed in light of the purpose of the
forum and all the surrounding circumstances” [30, p. 809]. The relation-
ships between the three forum categories I have discussed above are il-
lustrated in table 1.
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TABLE 1
Framework for a Forum-Based Approach to Public Forums
Category Description Level of Review
Nature and Effect of
Review
Public forum Government property
that has tradition-
ally been available
for public expres-
sion (e.g., streets,
sidewalks, parks)
Highest (strict) scrutiny Regulations survive
only if they are nar-
rowly drawn to
achieve a compelling
state interest
Content-neutral time,
place, and manner
regulations allowed
Upheld if reasonable
Designated
or lim-
ited pub-
lic fo-
rum:
Property that the state
has opened for ex-
pressive activity by:
Regulation of such
property subject to
the same limitations
as that governing a
traditional public
forum
Government retains
the power to dedi-
cate its property for
speech, either for
full or limited
expression
Unlimited All of the public
Limited Part of the public
Nonpublic
forum
All other public
property
Limited review for rea-
sonableness as long
as no attempt to sup-
press because of dis-
agreement with
speaker’s view
Limitations on expres-
sive activity need
only survive a much
more limited review
IV. The Public Library: What Forum?
What kind of forum is a public library? Is it a public forum, or a designated/
limited one? Why does it matter what type of forum a public library is
characterized as being? The question is significant because, as discussed
above, the answer determines the analysis and the level of review of reg-
ulations constraining speech.
A series of cases that have considered this question have all concluded,
without much analysis, that the public library is not a traditional public
forum. According to the courts, the public library is, for the purposes of
First Amendment analysis, a limited public forum, even though they ac-
knowledge the status of the library as the “quintessential locus of the receipt
of information” and recognize the right to receive information.9 One court
9. See, e.g., [2; 3, p. 1259], and [4, p. 563]. Interestingly, while insisting that the public library
is only a limited forum, the courts nevertheless seem to have embraced two important
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even went further to declare that even though the library was “not a tra-
ditional public forum, the library’s practice of allowing use of its audito-
rium by groups unrelated to the library’s mission had created a public
forum” [33]. Thus, I am perfectly willing to recognize public forums within
spaces in the public library, but I am only willing to accord the status of
a limited public forum to the public library itself. Public libraries, it would
seem, simply do not fit into the categories of streets, sidewalks and parks
that have “time out of mind . . . been used for the purposes of assembly,
communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions” [10, p. 515].
A case involving denial of patron’s access to the library based on his
failure to wear shoes is illustrative of the courts’ forum analysis of public
libraries [2]. The Court in Neinast begins by declaring that, for the purposes
of First Amendment analysis, a library is a limited public forum. As a limited
public forum, therefore, it is only required to allow the exercise of those
rights by the public that are consistent with the nature of a library and
the government’s purpose in designating the library as a public forum [2].
However, because the issue in dispute went to the library’s interest in
protecting public health, the Court did not go into a discussion of what
the nature of a library is and what the government’s purpose is in char-
acterizing it as a designated public forum. The closest the courts have
come to such a discussion was in describing libraries as traditionally pro-
viding a place for “reading, writing, and quiet contemplation” [3].
In discussing limited public forums, both Kreimer and Mainstream Loudoun
employ forum analysis to review library policies and regulations. Kreimer, on
the one hand, involved a homeless man who was a frequent visitor to the
public library of Morristown, New Jersey. The library expelled him five times
on the grounds that he violated library policy on patron conduct by, among
other things, talking loudly to himself, staring and following other users,
and having an offensive body odor. Mainstream Loudoun, on the other hand,
involved a challenge to a library’s policy of limiting access to certain content
on the Internet, which it implemented by installing site-blocking software.
Both cases involved the First Amendment. Even though Kreimer upheld the
library’s policy while Mainstream Loudoun invalidated it, both cases con-
cluded, as we shall see below, that the public library is a designated or limited
public forum—Kreimer because the public library was dissimilar to traditional
public forums and Mainstream Loudoun because Kreimer said so.
As I shall discuss below, this failure by the courts in analyzing the nature
American Library Association documents: the Library Bill of Rights and the Intellectual
Freedom Manual. The courts have described public libraries as “designed for freewheeling
inquiry”; see [31]. A public library is “the quintessential locus of the receipt of information”;
see [3, p. 1255]. A library is a “mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas”; see [32,
p. 582].
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of a public library has left the library miscategorized as a limited public
forum and has resulted in the courts narrowly drawing the contours of
that forum within the library itself.
The conclusion that the public library is a limited public forum derives
from the notion of a building (private property) owned by the government.
But what are we to make of the observation that members of the public
are allowed to freely enter and leave the library when it is open and that
this a place to have access to information, the essential stuff of First Amend-
ment concerns? The Court in Greer v. Spock, reaching to the concept of
the state as a property owner, rejected “the principle that whenever mem-
bers of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated
by the government, then that place becomes a ‘public forum’ for purposes
of the First Amendment” [29; 34]. But the context here was within a
military base training soldiers and not a building providing reading ma-
terial and other access to information. But, has the government inten-
tionally opened the library, a “nontraditional forum” for public discourse?
The courts have admitted as much. The crucial question goes to the extent
of this opening—whether, as I argue below, it has created, rather than a
limited public forum, a full-fledged public forum of the same stature as
streets, sidewalks, and parks.
Is there, then, any historical or constitutional support for the charac-
terization of the public library as a public forum? As I discussed above,
streets, parks, and sidewalks gained their public forum status simply by
being used as such. But the courts seem to have closed off membership
in that category to only the existing members.10 I propose to open up this
category to new membership and plant the public library firmly within it.
I begin by examining the “special attributes” and “surrounding circum-
stances” of public libraries. Public libraries are probably one of the very
few government institutions that government has funded and provided
free to members of the public, wholly for the enjoyment of the public,
without expecting accountability for the benefit of being able to access
information. Government has done this in the belief that an informed
citizenry is essential for the functioning of democracy. The public library,
like the street, the sidewalk, and the park, is an essential component of
the marketplace of ideas. As in the streets, members of the public have
open ingress and egress; they meet to exchange information, among other
activities. Certain areas in the library may not be accessible to the public;
but similarly, certain areas of the street, such as manholes and maintenance
areas, are restricted from members of the public.
10. This is reminiscent of the Security Council permanent membership at the United Nations
in which only the original five member countries are permanent members, with the
exception of Russia, which took the former USSR seat. The other ten members are elected.
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I reach back to Grayned, not to the decisional analysis, but to the dictum’s
analysis of the issue of public forums. When determining the kinds of
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable, we look at the
nature of a place and “the pattern of its normal activities” to see “whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time” [14, p. 116]. Stone notes that
In [the Grayned dictum], the right to a public forum came of age. No longer does
the right to effective freedom of expression turn on the common law property
rights of the state, and no longer does it turn on whether the particular place at
issue has historically been dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment rights.
The streets, parks, public libraries, and other publicly owned places are all brought
under the same roof. In each case, the “crucial question is whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.” [35, pp. 251–52]
I subscribe to the notion, therefore, that the definition of a traditional
public forum merely by appeal to its historical uses as such, and the re-
striction of membership to three or so enumerated members (streets, side-
walks, and parks), is flawed. The normal activity of a public library is access
and dissemination of information.
V. Regression: View of the Public Library as a Public Forum after United
States v. American Library Association
In United States v. American Library Association, the U.S. Supreme Court (the
ALA Court) reviewed the constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Pro-
tection Act (CIPA), which was challenged on its facial validity by a group
of libraries, users, and Web site publishers. CIPA was designed to protect
children from accessing sexual content through the Internet in the public
library by requiring libraries that received certain federal funding for con-
nectivity and Internet access to install filters in their network computers.11
The Court ruled CIPA constitutional because it was not in violation of the
free speech clause of the First Amendment, nor did it impose an imper-
missible condition on public libraries. The Court concluded that the fed-
eral assistance to libraries was meant to assist the libraries in its traditional
role of obtaining appropriate educational and informational material, and
Congress could demand that the funds be used only for that purpose. It
also concluded that Internet access in public libraries did not create either
a public forum or a designated one [1, p. 204].
11. The Telecommunications Act e-rates program and Library Services and Technology Act
(LSTA) grants.
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Accessing information from both the shelves and the computers in the
library is, despite the ALA Court’s conclusion, quite compatible with the
library’s normal activity. Contrary to the ALA Court’s view, the public library
implements a collection development policy not because of its desire to
censor, but because it cannot afford to buy everything, and also because
not everything is appropriate for its collection. Pages from the accounting
book of the local church, for example, might not be appropriate unless
the library has a local history collection. On the Internet, cost of the
material is not a factor. the ALA Court seemed to adopt the patronizing
view held by the nobility for commoners: we know what is best for you.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the reluctance of courts to recognize
public libraries as full-fledged public forums has been the speaker/receiver
dichotomy. In the traditional forums, our main interest is protecting the
speaker; we already assume the public has a right to hear the speaker. The
problem then becomes that we are not concerned with protecting the
speaker in a public library. Indeed, users have to suppress a fair amount
of speech in order for the library to carry out its mission. But suppression
of speech is also common in streets and parks; otherwise, the usefulness
of those venues for transportation and recreation would permanently be
undermined if demonstrations occurred every day and night of the year.
Thus, that speakers are restrained in the range of their speech does not
detract from the public forum nature of the traditional forums.
As we have seen above, when dealing with First Amendment free speech
issues in the context of public libraries, courts have merely cited the sup-
position that constitutional public forum analysis leads to the conclusion
that the public library is a limited public forum. In its 2003 decision in
United States v. American Library Association, the U.S. Supreme Court was
presented, for the first time, with an opportunity to analytically define what
kind of forum a public library is. But, by focusing narrowly on the issue
of whether Internet access in libraries constitutes a public forum and de-
termining that it does not, the Court not only missed an opportunity to
refine the concept of the public forum in modern-day terms but also
somehow implied that public library activities are different from other
speech activities and are subject to the managerial authority of the
government.
By framing the issue in this manner, the Court needed only view filters
as time, place, and manner regulations, somehow overlooking the require-
ment that such regulations be content neutral. In any case, the Court
seemed determined to reach a decision based on the Congress spending
power clause, which fit rather nicely with the concept of managerial
authority.
The Krishna Court defined public forums as limited to that public prop-
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erty which has as “a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas . . .
this purpose must be evidenced by a long-standing historical practice of
permitting speech” [26, pp. 2711–12]. Clearly, public libraries would fall
under the category of public property that exists to facilitate the free
exchange of ideas. Applying this view of public libraries would have allowed
the Court to veer away from the antiquated doctrine of the quintessential
public forums limited to streets, parks, and sidewalks.
In his concurrence in Krishna, Kennedy describes as fiction that these
particular places have public discourse as their principal purpose [26, p.
2717]. According to Kennedy, streets and sidewalks exist to facilitate trans-
portation, while parks arguably are to provide beauty and open space.
Limiting the doctrine of public forums to these specific places “leaves
almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare
approval of the government” [26, p. 2716]. Kennedy pointed out the same
error that the ALA Court appears to commit: the “conclusion that the
public-forum status of public property depends on the government’s de-
fined purpose for the property or on an explicit decision by the govern-
ment to dedicate the property to expressive activity” [26, p. 2716]. Kennedy
was of the view that a public forum analysis “must be an objective one,
based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property” [26,
p. 2716] rather than on a historical determination. In our view, this would
permit the recognition of new public forums that would include the public
library.
The ALA Court should have shared Kennedy’s concern that failure to
recognize new forums will mean that “our forum doctrine retains no rel-
evance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing insularity . . .
our public forum doctrine must . . . allow the creation of public forums
which do not fit within the narrow tradition of streets, sidewalks, and parks.
We have allowed flexibility in our doctrine to meet changing technologies
in other areas of constitutional interpretation, . . . and I believe we must
do the same with the First Amendment” [26, p. 2717].
From this perspective, the ALA Court’s failure to take up this challenge
is a disappointment. It leaves the public library forum analysis in a worse
position than it was before Grayned. As Justice Souter pointed out in his
dissent: “Public forum analysis is stultified not only by treating its archetypes
as closed categories, but by treating its candidates so categorically as to
defeat their identification with the archetypes” [26, pp. 2711, 2724].
If the ALA Court had followed Kennedy’s analysis, we would “accord
public forum status to other forms of property, regardless of its ancient or
contemporary origins and whether or not it fits within a narrow historic
tradition.” This would permit us to look at public libraries from a purpose
point of view: “If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at
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issue and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by
the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum” [26, p. 2718].
I would argue that if the Court is persistent in its traditional public
forum analysis, then the public library should assume its seat in the quin-
tessential traditional public forums. The public library would be included
among those types of government properties that have “by history and
tradition been available for speech activity” [26, p. 2718]. Alternatively, we
should, as the ALA Court should have done, redefine what a public forum
is and make sure the public library fits in.12 In any case, it is interesting
to note that while the courts characterize the public library as a designated
forum, the public library can be said to open a public forum when it allows
groups to use its auditorium.
The Court fails to distinguish public libraries from classrooms and school
libraries and seems to apply an analysis of the latter two to public libraries.
The Court seems to be equating the rights of adults in a public library to
the rights of students in schools and public libraries. The spending power
clause might apply here. However, while the government is not obligated
to subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights, including speech rights
[36], CIPA is not only not subsidizing but is interfering with the exercise
of a right. Even though the government may elect not to subsidize speech,
CIPA helps to subsidize some speech and not others, and this is discrim-
inatory. This discrimination is especially the kind targeted by First Amend-
ment doctrine, as it discriminates on the basis of the viewpoint of the
speech involved, a pure example of a “law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press” [37, pp. 383–84].
Contemporary public forum doctrine that the Court in ALA is allowing
to continue focuses on the kind of government property at issue and the
historical First Amendment treatment of such property, whether or not
the exercise of First Amendment rights is compatible with the nature of
the property [38, p. 1766]. But even this approach puts the public library
within the public forum ambit, because First Amendment rights have his-
torically been the mainstay of public libraries.
The Court’s treatment of public libraries can only be understood within
Post’s theory of managerial authority. Post pointed to “two kinds of gov-
ernment authority” in “dealing with the internal management of speech,
. . . management and governance, each controlled by distinct kinds of
first amendment rules” [38, p. 1776]. When the environment has been
described as a public forum, then government’s authority over that envi-
ronment can be viewed as a matter of governance, while the same authority
12. The district court in ALA came closest to correctly characterizing the public forum nature
of public libraries, although it also confined itself to Internet access.
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in a nonpublic forum would be described as managerial authority [38, p.
1776]. Governance invites a higher scrutiny of speech restricting regula-
tions than does managerial authority in which the government can inter-
nally regulate speech.
On the premise that the library is the government’s own institution, the
government then would view CIPA as a regulation “necessary in order to
achieve the institution’s legitimate objectives,” to achieve what Post calls,
“managerial authority over speech” [38, p. 1769]. This raises the question
of whether First Amendment rights can be so radically devalued on receipt
of federal funds. This is especially poignant given the fact that the libraries
did not need the Court’s help in upholding their managerial authority, as
demonstrated by the fact that their premier association took the plaintiff’s
role on their behalf.
In United States v. Playboy, the Court ruled that the Telecommunications
Act’s “signal bleed” provision that required cable operators to scramble or
limit programming to certain hours was a content regulation, because the
regulation was not concerned with signal bleed from other types of chan-
nels, only those with sexually oriented programming [39]. The Children’s
Internet Protection Act is comparable in its focus on filtering sexually
oriented material and especially attracts our attention because it occurs in
a public forum environment, whether traditional or designated. A concern
with children would focus on always leaving the filters off and turning
them on when a minor requests access, rather than on until an adult
requests disabling.13
Cornelius [30] defined a traditional public forum as property that has “a
principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.” This would seem to
fit the public library’s mission rather well. But the Court in ALA, in its
discussion of the nature of a public library, chooses to focus instead on
the “reading” and cultural aspects of the public library. The case of Main-
stream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Library [4], a federal district court
case, concerned the blocking of sexually explicit Web sites. Even though
the court there followed the previous courts’ conclusions that the public
library is a limited forum, it pointed out that once opened up to expressive
activity, content restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.14 The ALA Court
failed to follow its own previous constitutional analysis and chose to focus
instead on the spending power clause.
The ALA Court spent considerable time discussing why a public library’s
provision of access to the Internet does not create a public forum. This is
13. One should always be mindful, of course, of the level of First Amendment rights that
children have.
14. Of course, the effect of United States v. American Library Association is to overrule the decision
in Mainstream Loudoun.
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presumably because the provision is emanating from the building where
the government is exercising its managerial authority. But several questions
beg answers. For example, what about remote access to a library’s com-
puters? What about mobile libraries on public streets? What if mobile
libraries bring laptops for patrons to access databases, instead of just lend-
ing books? Are architectural limitations the defining contours of a public
forum? In any case, the Court had the wrong focus in stating that the
library does not provide Internet access in order to provide Web publishers
with a public forum in which to express themselves [1]. The focus ought
to have been on the user, not the producers of the information products.
After all, some of the plaintiffs were users.15 Similarly, the focus of the
library is on book users, not on book publishers.
Even if the Internet is “no more than a technological extension of the
book stack,” [1, p. 2305] it does multiply the book stack and viewpoints a
thousandfold. When patrons are accessing the Internet, they are expressing
themselves through, for example, list-servs, chat rooms, e-mail, and other
tools. They are also exercising their right to receive information and ideas.16
By conditioning receipt of federal funds on public libraries’ curtailing of
Internet access, Congress is applying the kinds of unconstitutional con-
ditions proscribed in NEA v. Finley [41].17
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court fails to instruct us on what the characterization
of government property has to do with the right to exercise First Amend-
ment freedoms. Apart from Post’s theory of managerial authority, I find
little theoretical connection between cases involving public forum doctrine
and cases involving the regulation of the speech where the context is within
15. A summary of the categories of plaintiffs is instructive: there were nine library associations
representing themselves and their members; six public library systems (one including 51
member public libraries); a library board; three patron associations; ten individual library
users; and four Web publishers.
16. See Stanley v. Georgia [40]. The “right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society.” A fundamental difference between
print resources and Internet interactivity seems to be that in the latter you do not have
merely readers but speakers as well. Users who chose not to use the filtered computers
and did not wish to request that the filters be turned off would not be able to express
themselves in any way through the Internet in the library.
17. Unconstitutional conditions refers to the prohibition on government’s conditioning re-
ceipt of federal funds on the recipient abridging individuals’ constitutional rights. It is
an open question whether libraries as public entities can rely on the First Amendment
rights of their patrons to assert the unconstitutional conditions claim.
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government institutions or where the speakers are recipients of govern-
ment assistance.
As Post already noted, contemporary public forum doctrine is character-
ized by “doctrinal incoherence and the absence of underlying constitutional
justification” [38, p. 1767] and focuses not on the character of government
property but with the nature of managerial authority [p. 1781], which is a
retreat from the teachings of Perry [42]. According to Post:
At present, public forum doctrine distinguishes public from nonpublic forums on
the basis of a “long tradition” of use for “assembly and debate.” The difficulty with
this approach is that the Court has been unable to explain why such a tradition
should have special constitutional consequences. As reformulated, however, public
and nonpublic forums should be distinguished according to whether government
authority over a resource is “like” that characteristic of the internal management
of a state institution, or instead “like” that characteristic of the governance of the
general public. [38, p. 1784]
Post suggests, and I agree, that a resource should be characterized as a
public or nonpublic forum based on the social practices within which it
is entrenched [38, p. 1800]. Viewed in this vein, the social practices within
a library encompass, in addition to the promotion of culture and reading,
the facilitation of transmission of ideas, essential aspects of a thriving mar-
ketplace of ideas. How, then, can it not be a public forum?
The courts have no business substituting their own opinions for those
of the responsible decision maker on the most appropriate method of
promoting government interests when analyzing violations of speech in
public forums [43]. That libraries were among the plaintiffs opposing CIPA
filtering requirements suggests that the Court could not then claim that
it was acting on behalf of the libraries, that it was effectively empowering
them with collection development decisions.
The Court set us up by casually designating the public library as a limited
public forum, thereby allowing it to apply only a reasonableness standard
to its analysis of CIPA. If it had gone through the extra step of determining
critically what kind of forum a public library is and if it had come to our
conclusion that the public library is indeed a public forum, then CIPA, as
a content-specific regulation, would not have stood a chance at passing
constitutional muster. Certainly, a forum analysis would have affected the
constitutionality of the invocation of the spending power clause in this
particular case. In any case, while invoking the spending power clause, the
ALA Court noted approvingly the insistence that “public funds be spent
for the purposes for which they were authorized” [1, p. 2308]. What the
Court failed to notice was that the e-rate and LSTA funds were used pre-
cisely for the purposes for which they had been provided, namely, to pro-
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vide connectivity. Use of filtering software does not help in connectivity
and thus is not a permissible condition under NEA [41].
Comparing the two ALA decisions, the one in the district court [44]
and the one by the U.S. Supreme Court, we see that there are striking
differences in the levels of analysis that went into the final ruling.18 The
district court went to great lengths to analyze both the nature of the public
library and the nature of Internet access.19 It even took the time to decide
which level of analysis it should use—the entire library collection or In-
ternet access. The U.S. Supreme Court just assumed the public library was
a government property and that the government was merely exercising
managerial control when it applied CIPA. The U.S. Supreme Court seems
to have ignored even the usual homage to public libraries as designated
forums; it merely focused on what it concluded was the nonforum nature
of Internet access. In contrast, the district court briefly compared the public
library favorably to sidewalks and parks, in the sense that they are generally
open to the public to receive speech, and noted that public libraries, like
traditional public forums, are funded by taxpayers and do not charge
admission [44, pp. 466–67].
Perhaps there should be a new category of public forums, a mixed or
dual forum. In the case of the public library, the parts accessible by the
public would enjoy the full privileges of a public forum subject to strict
scrutiny of speech content regulations and falling under the governance
prong, while the staff-only accessible areas would fall under the managerial
authority prong. Streets already enjoy this duality: while demonstrators will
sometimes walk in the middle of the street, a pedestrian may still be subject
to a citation for walking in nondesignated areas in the streets of San
Francisco.
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